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NOTES
tinction to reinstate the limited review of agency decision in this area. But
in any event the imposition of standards of review essentially unrelated to
the nature of administrative agencies seems unwise. The probable result
would be the development of two separate bodies of practice under the
same rubric, a result that would hardly be an improvement over the present
situation. It is submitted that if the scope of review is to be changed,
the better course would be formulation of rules not directly related to
current appellate practice. Any change will require a period of litigation
to implement the substituted standards. Use of new standards would
avoid the confusion that is inevitable in the application of the same rule to
decisions of different kinds of adjudicators,' and would encourage the
development of rules properly adapted to the actual functions of administrative agencies.

THE BUSINESS TRUST AS AN ORGANIZATION
FOR PRACTICING LAW
On numerous occasions Congress has recognized the substantial inequities in the tax structure for professional men who must conduct their
business in partnership form, and the Internal Revenue Service has recently reaffirmed a desire to perpetuate those inequities.' Organizations
that can meet the requisites for taxation as a "corporation" or "association" under the Internal Revenue Code receive manifold tax benefits a
partnership cannot which are too familiar to require enumeration.2 The
150. While the same criticism might be made of application of the substantial
evidence rule to jury and agency, it can be argued that whatever differences in application ewist have been settled by several decades of practice under the rule.
1. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 64, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1959); S. Rep. No. 1615,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960).
On December 17, 1963, The IRS published its long awaited proposed regulations
to Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1-2. Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1-2, 28 Fed. Reg. 243
(1963). If adopted, these regulations would exclude any possibility of professional
persons gaining corporate tax advantages. These proposed regulations, it is hardly
necessary to say, will be vigorously opposed, and face a slim chance of being adopted
in their present form.
2. Briefly summarized these benefits are: contributions to qualified pension and
profit sharing plans for lawyer-employees are deductible from income, INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 401(a) ; when profit sharing and pension plans are utilized, amounts up to
25 per cent of employees' yearly compensation is deductible, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 404(a) (7); the income from such plans is tax exempt, and may be reinvested tax
free,ibid; contributions made on behalf of an employee are not included in his income
until the money is actually received by him, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402; if an
employee elects to receive the entire amount from these plans within one year of
termination of his employment, the amount received may be declared a long term capital
gain, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402(a) (2), 1201(b) ; premiums on group life, health
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1962 Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act was originally conceived to equalize in large measure the tax benefits available to the various business forms, but as a consequence of its long and arduous battle
in Congress over a period of twelve years, the Keough Bill established
little more than a limited pension plan.'
A result of the Keough Bill's practical failure has been that states
continue to enact professional association and corporation statutes in an
attempt to invest business forms with those characteristics which, under
the Kintner Regulations, would entitle them to taxation as an association. 4
At present, the Treasury Regulations prescribe that organizations qualify
and accident insurance policies are not included in an employee's income, INT. RE'.
CODE OF 1954, § 106; such payments are deductible from the organization's income,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 106; payments by the corporation for sick or injured employees up to one hundred dollars a week are excluded from their income, INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 105(d) ; payments to an employee and his family as reinbursement for
medical expenses are receivable tax free, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 105(b) ; and
finally, payments up to five thousand dollars to the beneficiary or estate of a deceased
employee are tax free, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b).
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, as amended, 76 Stat. 809 (1962). Not only is the
pension plan allowed under the act much less comprehensive, but it does not provide for
the five thousand dollar tax free death benefit, one hundred dollar a week sick pay
exclusion or the estate and gift tax exclusions available to corporate employees. See
Grayck, Tax Qualified Retirement Plans for Professional Practitioners: A Comparison of the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962 and the Professional
Association, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 415, 432 (1963).

For a general history of the efforts to secure for self-employed persons the same
advantages which are available to corporation employees, see Rapp, The Quest for Tax
Equality for Private Pension Plans: A Short History of the Jenkins-Keogh Bill, 14
TAx L. REv. 55 (1958), and Rapp, Pensions for the Self-Employed: The Treasury
Department-Finance Committee Plan, 16 TAX L. REv. 227 (1961).
4. At least 30 states have authorized the use of a corporate form of organization
by professional practitioners. The professional association statutes are: ALA. CODE tit.
46, §§ 330 to 345 (Supp. 1961); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-82 (Supp. 1962); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 84-4301 to -4318 (Supp. 1963) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10612 §§ 101 to 111
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1963); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1785.01 to .08 (Page Supp. 1963);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 §§ 197-1 to -9 (Purdon Supp. 1962); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 561601 to -1617 (Supp. 1963) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-105(3) (Supp. 1963) ; Trx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon Supp. 1962); VA. CODE ANN. 88 54-873 to -898
(Supp. 1962).
The professional corporation statutes are: ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-901 to
-909 (Supp. 1963); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-2001 to -2018 (Supp. 1963); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 621.01 to .14 (Supp. 1962); IDAHiO CODE ANN. §§ 30-1401 to -1414 (Supp.
1963) ; Ky. REv. STAT. H8 274.005 to .990 (1962) ; MASS. LAWS 1963, S.B. 931 (1963)
MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.315(1)
to .315(15) (Supp. 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
319.01 to .23 (Supp. 1963) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 356.010 to .200 (Vernon Supp. 1963);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 15-2101 to -2116 (Supp. 1963) ; NEv. LAWS 1963, ch. 385;
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14: 19-1 to 19-17 (Supp. 1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-22-1 to
-22-13 (Supp. 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-31-01 to -31-14 (Supp. 1963); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 18 §§ 801 to 819 (1961) ; S.D. Sess. Laws 1961, cl. 29, §§ 1-19 as amended
by S.D. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 34; UTAHE CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-1 to -11-15 (Supp. 1963);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 901 to 913 (Supp. 1963); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.99(1)
to (11) (Supp. 1963).
Colo. Sup. Ct. (Civ.) R. ch. 19, § 231 authorizes lawyers to form professional
corporations in accordance with the Colorado Corporation Code.

NOTES
as associations within the Internal Revenue Code if they possess the "primary" corporate characteristics of associates and an object to carry on a
business and divide profits, as well as a majority of the "secondary"
corporate characteristics of limited liability, centralization of management, free transferability of interests and continuity of life.5 Additionally, while the code and regulations establish and define the characteristics or standards of an association, they also provide that local law is
determinative as to the existence of these characteristics in a particular
organizational form.6 It is the latter provision which has given impetus
to the enactment of the above-mentioned state statutes.
Indiana's legislators have not been unmindful of the tax benefits
that have been denied that state's recognized professions. In the 1961
General Assembly a "Professional Corporation Act" was introduced to
provide corporate tax benefits for the state's traditional professions which
failed to win final approval, and the 1963 Assembly enacted a "Professional Medical Corporation Act" allowing doctors to seek corporate tax
advantages.7 The 93rd Assembly also passed the "Indiana Business
Trust Act of 1963," presumably enacted merely to resolve the uncertain
legal status of the business or "Massachusetts" trust as a permissible
5. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(2), (3) (1960).
The Income Tax Law of 1913 (32 Stat. 172 § 2(g)) provided for taxing the net
income of "every corporation, joint-stock company or association, and every insurance
company organized in the United States, no matter how created or organized, not including partnerships." Interpretation of the word "association" was filled with a great
deal of uncertainty until the landmark case of Morrisey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344
(1935), was decided. Chief Justice Hughes, delivering the opinion of the Court, enumerated the textually stated primary and secondary characteristics which are used to
determine whether organizations are to be classified as associations for purposes of the
Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 357.
6. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960). These regulations came as an outgrowth
of United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), which involved a group of
doctors who dissolved a partnership and formed an unincorporated association to practice medicine, providing for the characteristics necessary to be classified as a corporation for tax purposes. The Commissioner argued that doctors could not, under state
law, practice medicine in an organization which possessed these characteristics, and
that since the organization would be treated as a partnership for purposes of liability,
etc., the organization should be taxed as a partnership. The court ruled that the doctors
could form such an association for income tax purposes even though under state law
the association would be treated as a partnership since, according to its own regulations, the IRS was not bound by determinations under local law. In an effort to combat
the ruling in the Kintner case, the IRS promulgated Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -4.
7. The Professional Corporation Act, S. 73, 92d Ass'bly (1961) was introduced
on January 13, 1961, and passed by a vote of 45 to 2 on February 7, 1961. After the
bill went to the House of Representatives on February 14, it was referred to committee
and subsequent committee amendments altered the bill to such an extent it never reappeared.
The Medical Corporation Act is IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-4901 to -4921 (Burns
Supp. 1963).
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form of organization for conducting business.8 This act resembles typical state legislation on business trusts with the exception of one intentionally engrafted provision. The definition section provides:
A "business trust" is an unincorporated business association
which is created by a trust instrument, pursuant to common law
or enabling legislation, under which property is held, managed,
administered, controlled, invested, re-invested, and/or operated,
or business or professionalactivitiesfor profit are carried on, by
a trustee or trustees for the benefit and profit of such person
or persons as are or may become the holders of transferrable
certificates .
estate. .. 9

.

.

evidencing beneficial interests in the trust

If the phrase "business or professional activities for profit" is interpreted to include architects, chiropractors, osteopaths, engineers, doctors,"0 lawyers and certified public accountants, the act is obviously capable of rendering significant tax advantages to these persons should their
respective professions sanction the ethics of practicing in business trusts.
And there is no question that the act has granted the greatest latitude in
meeting both the provisions of the federal tax laws and the ethical problems of each profession. The definition section requires that the trust's
purpose be to carry on business and divide profits among shareholders,
allows either restricted or unrestricted transfer of interests as well as
shareholder limited liability," and the act prescribes that the trust instru8. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-4803 (Burns Supp. 1963). Before 1927 the courts seemed
to approve of the business trust as it developed in Massachusetts, as a legitimate business form. Ridge v. State, 192 Ind. 639, 137 N.E. 758 (1924). However, in McLaren
v. Dawes Sign & Mfg. Co., 86 Ind. App. 196, 156 N.E. 584 (1927), the Indiana Appellate Court cast considerable doubt upon the legality of such a business organization,
and as a result the business trust was generally considered illegal in Indiana. See
generally Brown, Contractual Limitation of Liability by the So-Called "Massachusetts
Trust," under Indiana Law, 3 IND. L.J. 318, 324 (1927). See also Note, Professional
Associations and Qualified Pension Plans, 27 IND. L.J. 124, 136 (1962).
9. IN . ANN. STAT. § 25-4802(a) (Burns Supp. 1963) (Emphasis added.) The
emphasized phrase was not a part of House Bill No. 1102 as introduced in the General
Assembly, but was an amendment recommended by Judiciary Committee "A" of the House
of Representatives. The entire bill was rewritten in committee and followed quite
closely the Kansas Business Trust Act with the exception of the phrase in question.
See KAN. GEN. STAT. art. 20 §§ 17-2027 to -2038 (Supp. 1961).
10. The Medical Corporation Act provides many of the features which are available in a business trust, but it allows less flexibility than does the business trust act.
If physicians are included under the business trust act, a practitioner could chose the
one best suited to his needs.
11. A "business trust" is an unincorporated business association which is
created by a trust instrument . . . under which property is held, managed,
administered, controlled, invested, reinvested, and/or operated, or business or
professional activities for profit are carried on, by a trustee or trustees for the
benefit and profit of such person or persons as are or may become the holders of
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ment shall be conclusive of the trust's power and authority to transact
business. 2 Because the phrase will, practically speaking, be of no consequence unless professional men can ethically conduct their business in
trust form and at the same time secure tax benefits, this note will explore
the difficulties encountered in simultaneously meeting both sets of standards. The discussion will concentrate on the ethical problems facing
lawyers, but to the extent that other professions face similar ethical strictures, it will apply to them as well. But first the phrase "business and
professional activities for profit" must be examined to be certain it encompasses attorneys, and the legislature's power to authorize the practice
of law in business trusts must be questioned.
I. THE INDIANA BUSINESS TRUST ACT
Interpretationof the Statute
The meaning of the phrase "business and professional activities for
profit" is not at once apparent, and the remainder of the statute in no
way limits its effect ;3 its scope must be assessed by a construction of its
terms. Because it is commonplace for "business activities" to be carried
on in business trust form, 4 the major construction problem is interprettransferable certificates ... which have either restricted or unrestricted transferability. . . . Such business trust may provide that the holders of such certificates are entitled to the same limitation of personal liability extended to stockholders of private corporations for profit.
IxND. AxN. STAT. § 25-4802(a) (Burns Supp. 1963).
12. "The power and authority of any business trust authorized under this act to
transact business in this state shall be as specified in the instrument by which it was
created . . . which instrument shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with
the common and statutory law applicable to business trusts." IND. ANN. STAT. § 254803 (Burns Supp. 1963).
Certain problems may arise when interpreting the trust instrument in accordance
with common and statutory law applicable to business trusts, but these problems will be
dealt with in relation to the ethical problems created by the corporate characteristics
necessary to satisfy the Internal Revenue Code.
13. The only specific provision of the act which tends to limit the effect of the
language used in the definition section is in IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-4808 (Burns Supp.
1963) :
No business trust shall engage in the business of operating a rural loan and
savings association or credit union or have the power or authority to conduct a
banking, railroad, insurance, surety, safe deposits, mortgage guaranty, or building and loan business, or in the business of mining or manufacturing, or in
any business regulated under the Public Service Commission of Indiana, or take
any action which is in violation of this act.
On its face this provision does not appear to limit the term "professional activities"
in any manner, but is directed solely toward business activities. Supporting this interpretation of the provision's application to business activities is the presence of these
same restrictions on domestic and foreign corporations. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-201
(Burns 1960), and IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-302 (Burns Supp. 1963).
14. Annot., 156 A.L.R. 21, 81 (1945). Examples of business activities conducted
in trusts are petroleum refining, mercantile business, restaurants, laundries, motion
picture production, newspapers, summer resorts and livestock trading.
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ing "professional activities."
It could be argued that the statute was not intended to apply to the
traditional professions recited in the 1961 Professional Corporation Act,
i.e., to lawyers, doctors, certified public accountants, etc.,15 because these
have been historically described as activities of public service, not of
"profit."'" But the argument would have little to commend it; there are
several plausible explanations for use of the words "for profit" which
indicate they were not intended to preclude the statute's application to the
traditional professions. First, the general corporation act categorizes
corporations as either "for profit" or "not for profit."' 7 A "not for
profit corporation" is one which "does not engage in any activities for
the profit of its members and is organized and conducts its affairs for
purposes other than the pecuniary gain of its members."'" Even if attorneys encountered no ethical problems by practicing law in corporate
form, it is obvious that they could not meet the requirements of a "not
for profit corporation," and it would make no more sense to say that
their practice is an activity "not for profit." Moreover, if the traditional professions are excluded from those which can form business
trusts solely because their primary motive is public service, they would
also be unable to practice law under a partnership agreement since the
uniform act defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."'9 It seems clear that
a major reason for the words "for profit" was simply to exclude traditional non-profit activities from the act.2" Second, the drafters might
15. "'Professional Service' means any type of professional service which may be
legally performed only pursuant to a license or other legal authorization, e.g., the
personal service rendered by certified public accountants, chiropractors, dentists, osteopaths, physicians and surgeons, attorneys at law and life insurance agents." S. 73, 92d
Ass'bly (1961).
16. When we speak of the recognized professions . . . we mean an organized
calling in which men pursue a learned art and are united in the pursuit of it
as a public service-as I have said, no less a public service because they may
make a livelihood thereby. Here from the professional standpoint there are
three essential ideas-organization, learning, and a spirit of public service.
The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional consideration. Indeed, the
professional spirit, the spirit of public service, constantly curbs the urge of that
instinct.
Address by Dean Roscoe Pound, Nebraska State Bar Association, October 20, 1949 in
Re Rothinan, 12 N.J. 528, 548, 97 A.2d 621, 631 (1953).
17. INn. ANN. STAT. § 25-101 to -723 (Burns 1960).
18. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-507(d) (Burns 1960).
19. IN . ANN. STAT. § 50-406 (Burns 1951) (Emphasis added.)
20. This conclusion is substantiated by the filing fees which are to be charged a
business trust in Indiana. Business trusts are required to pay a fee of two cents for
each one hundred dollars of the corpus of the trust and must pay an additional filing
fee of six dollars. In no case can the application fee be less than twenty dollars. IND.
ANN. STAT. § 25-4805 (Burns Supp. 1963). A domestic corporation for profit must
pay a filing fee of two cents per share on the first twenty thousand shares and two
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have thought that using the words "for profit" would help secure the desired tax benefits.2 As seen above, an essential characteristic of any
organization for taxation as a corporation is an objective to engage in
business for profit.2 The drafters perhaps felt a failure to require business trusts to organize for profit could result in their taxation as regular
trusts, rather than as corporations.23
To say "professional activities for profit" embraces conventional
professions, e.g., the legal profession, does not fully delineate the phrase.
The Indiana General Assembly could have intended "professional" to depict not only traditional professions, but any vocation in which the work
is predominantly intellectual rather than physical.24 It is doubtful however that such a construction would be justified, for it presumes that
business activities for profit can be differentiated from professional activities for profit. The distinction is virtually impossible to make. Professional activities whose primary goal is to gain profit, such as business
consultants, authors, psychologists, economists or artists, to mention a
few, are most appropriately termed business activities, and the term "professional" would therefore be redundant in part. If "professional" is
given the narrow interpretation, a business trust could be formed for
either of two distinct types of activity. Indeed, sound construction alone
requires the elimination of the redundancy, and allows both "business"
and "professional" to modify "activities for profit."
cents per share on all additional shares. This minimum fee is also twenty dollars. IND.
ANN. STAT. § 25-702 (Burns 1960). The fees charged a not for profit corporation
differ substantially from those charged the domestic corporation for profit and the
business trust in that a flat fee of ten dollars must be paid. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25602(a) (Burns 1960).
21. See note 2 supra.
22. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a) (2) (1960).
23. Ibid. In Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) a number of examples illustrate the
requisite characteristics for classification as an association. Examples 1, 2, & 3 deal with
organizations of doctors or lawyers. All three specifically mention that the purpose of
the organization is to furnish, for profit, medical or legal services to the public and then
conclude that the associations "have an objective to carry on business and divide the
gains therefrom." Simply because the Indiana Business Trust Act provides that all business trusts formed must be "for profit" does not mean that the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue will consider the terms of the Indiana Business Trust Act conclusive on the
subject. On the other hand, if that act requires that all trusts be organized for profit, a
business which can comply with the Indiana statute can also comply with the Treasury
Regulations. Furthermore, since local law plays such an important role in determining
whether the requirements of the Treasury Regulations are met, Treas. Reg. § 301.77011(c) (1960), the professions whose primary aim is to provide a public service and not to
gain profit may argue that the acceptance of the instrument for recording establishes
that the business trust was formed for the objective of gaining profit; otherwise the
instrument would not have been accepted.
24. A profession may be defined as "a vocation, calling, occupation or employment
involving labor, skill, education, and special knowledge . . . but the labor and skill is
predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than physical or manual." BLACK, LAW
DIcTi NARY

(4th ed. 1951).
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Legislative Power to Permit Practice of Law in Business Trust Form
Regardless of the legislature's intention, its efforts to secure tax
benefits for the legal profession are for naught if that is the sole prerogative of the judiciary. An oft-quoted opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts is that "it would not be within the competence of the
[legislature] . . . to enact legislation designed to permit [the] . . . prac-

tice of law 'by corporations or associations or by individuals other than
members of the bar of the Commonwealth.' ,25 The main theme of this
pronouncement seems to be that the legislature may not usurp the power
of the judiciary by prescribing who may be eligible to practice law, or in
what business form they can ethically practice. And, the opinion seems
entirely in harmony with the almost unanimously recognized fact that
control of court officers is one of the judiciary's inherent and exclusive
prerogatives through the doctrine of separate and implied powers. " Traditionally, and in Indiana, courts have prohibited lawyers from practicing in corporate form," and it might be thought that this traditional pro25. Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607 (1934).
26. "It is inherent in the judicial department of government under the Constitution
to control the practice of the law, the admission to the bar of persons found qualified
to act as attorneys at law, and the removal from that position of those once admitted
and found to be unfaithful to their trust." Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607 (1934).
See also People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937). For an excellent article
on the subject, reflecting in particular Indiana law, see Dowling, Inherent Power of the
Judiciary, 11 IND. L.J. 116 (1935). Only two states have denied the existence of the
inherent power of the judiciary-New York and Florida. In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860) ;
Petition of the Florida Bar Association, 145 Fla. 223, 199 So. 57 (1940) ; Barr v. Watts,
70 S.2d 347 (Fla. 1953). As a result of the cases in Florida a constitutional amendment
to that state's Constitution was proposed and adopted in the General Election of 1956.
It provided that "the supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the admission
to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted." FLA. CONsT. art. 5 § 23.
For the rationale of the power see People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941,
944 (1937). "The power to regulate and define the practice of law is a prerogative of the
judicial department as one of the three divisions of the government created by article 3
of our Constitution." Accord, Ex parte Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 667 (1893) ; Dowling, supra
at 120, 124.
27. For leading cases where the practice of law by a corporation was prohibited
see In re Co-operative Law Co., 199 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910) ; People v. Merchants
Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922) ; State ex rel. Lundin v. Protective
Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
As to Indiana particularly see Groninger v. Fletcher Trust Co., 220 Ind. 202, 41
N.E.2d 140 (1942), where the supreme court, although not necessary to the decision of
the case, held that "the practice of law is restricted to natural persons who have been
licensed upon the basis of established character and competence as a protection to the
public against lack of knowledge, skill, integrity, and fidelity." Id. at 207. Under the
Indiana Constitution courts are vested with the complete judicial power of the state.
The constitution provides that "the judicial power of the State shall be vested in a
Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts and such other courts as the General Assembly may
establish." Ind. Const. art. 7 § 1. Article 3 § 1 of the Indiana Constitution provides,
"The powers of Government are divided into three separate departments; the Legislative,
the Executive including the administrative, and the Judicial; and no person charged with
official duties under one of the three departments, shall exercise any of the functions of
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hibition could be extended to business trust practice by Opinion 283 of
the American Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances (ABA Committee) 28
But though the power to regulate attorneys resides in the courts,
and they exercise that power through rules of procedure, the two remaining departments of state government are not precluded from adopting
measures which affect attorneys. In exercising its police power the legislature may prescribe the permissible organizational forms for intrastate
business, regardless of whether lawyers are affected.2" The legislature
has an even more immediate interest in the practice of law than simply
regulating organizational structures, since other state residents are directly affected by a lawyer's legal competency. Thus, laws are passed which
prescribe punitive measures for the unauthorized practice of law and exclude certain public officials from the practice.3" The legislature therefore indirectly, if not directly, regulates the legal profession without unconstitutionally intruding upon the judicial prerogative. 1 In fact, the
state's legislative and judicial departments have a concurrent interest in
another except as in this Constitution expressly provided." Prior to 1931 the constitution
provided that every person of good moral character who was a voter was entitled to
practice law, IND. CONST. art. 3 § 21 (1854), and some attorneys have argued that
because of this provision the courts never have had exclusive power to regulate the
practice of law. In 1931 this section of the constitution was repealed by a referendum
vote, and a statute was passed granting the courts exclusive authority to regulate the
practice of law. IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-3605 (Burns 1933). It could be argued that the
courts have never possessed the right to regulate the practice of law except through the
grant of the legislature, and that the Indiana Business Trust Act has modified that
grant of power in allowing lawyers to practice law in a business trust. Such an argument
tends to misconstrue the original provisions of article 3, section 21 of the constitution.
That section referred only to the right to admission to the bar. Even though a voter
was entitled to practice law, the court could examine one's character before admission or
it could, once an attorney was admitted, prescribe rules of conduct and institute disciplinary proceedings against him. See State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21
N.E. 244 (1888).
As a necessary corollary to the judicial power the doctrine of implied powers confers
upon the judiciary the power to regulate matters pertaining to the courts, including
regulation of its officers. In re Cate, 273 Pac. 617, 620 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928)
Dowling, supra note 26, at 120 and cases cited therein.
28. "It is not professionally proper for a group of associates to practice law when
some are trustees of a common law trust and all are beneficiaries." ABA ComMIeTEE
ON PROFESSIONA.
AND JUDICIAL

ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES,

ETHICS, OPINIONS

Opinion 283, in

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL

OF COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL

ETHICS AND

GRIEv-

596 (1957).
29. Lawyers probably could not form a partnership violating the Uniform Partnership Act in Indiana and still have that organization recognized as a partnership.
30. For examples of statutes which have been enacted to assist the judiciary in its
control over the practice of law see IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 4-3601, -3602 (Burns 1933),
defining the unauthorized practice of law and prescribing penalties for such practice,
and IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3107, -3108 (Burns 1956), prohibiting municipal judges from
practicing law and prohibiting the encouragement of law suits.
31. See In re Harrison, 231 Ind. 665, 109 N.E.2d 722 (1953) ; People v. Goodman,
366 Ill.
346, 8 N.E.2d 941, 944 (1937) ; Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 612 (1934).
ANCES
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the practice of law, and both strive for an effective judicial system. The
judicial department establishes ethical standards of conduct for attorneys;
the legislature exacts their adherence to proper organizational structure
and provides punitive measures to insure that proper conduct is observed.
Returning to the admonition of the Massachusetts Supreme Court
against legislative usurpation of judicial regulatory powers, it is clear
that the Indiana Business Trust Act has not attempted such a usurpation.
The terms of the act are permissive." It merely recognizes the trust as a
legitimate business form for the professions and does not address itself
to the ethical propriety of business trust practice. Thus, the question has
been left to the individual professions and, in the case of lawyers, to the
judiciary.

II. TAX AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF PRACTICING LAW IN
BUSINESS TRUSTS

Although various reasons have been advanced for prohibiting the
practice of law in corporate form, the most frequent is that to do so
would violate the ethics of the legal profession. Virtually all opinions
that such practice is a violation of professional ethics were rendered
prior to the enactment of those statutes which allow the formation of
professional corporations or associations." As a result of these enactments several inquiries were directed to the ABA Committee concerning
the ethical propriety of forming organizations to practice law, to which

it replied:
[T]he substance of an agreement is controlling, not the form.
In other words, the mere fact that the form of organization
used by lawyers to practice law is a professional association
(other than the orthodox partnership) or is a professional corporation does not in and of itself constitute a violation of any
Canon. A look behind the form to the substance is required to
ascertain whether any Canon is violated. 4
The committee explained the real question is whether lawyers can practice in business organizations which permit limited liability, centralized
management, free transferability of interests and continuity of life with32. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-4803 (Burns Supp. 1963).
33. Opinion 283 of the American Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances was rendered in 1950, but professional corporations and associations did
not come into vogue until approximately 1958. The major portion of acts allowing professional practitioners to form corporations have been enacted since 1960.
34. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Opinion 303, 48 A.B.A.J.
159 (1961).
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out violating the Canons of Professional Ethics.3 5 To analyze these, the
secondary characteristics of corporate existence, and the canons, it is
assumed:
1. A group of lawyers join together and supply capital for a
trust.
2. From the group a smaller number is designated to serve as
trustees.
3. Certificates of beneficial interests are issued to all members.
4. The lawyer-members are employed by the trust to perform
legal services as they would in an orthodox partnership.
Limited Liability
The Treasury Regulations explain that an organization has limited
liability when "under local law there is no member personally liable for
the debts or claims against the organization."36 By contrast, in an organization like a general partnership created under a statute similar to
the UPA which has unlimited liability, each member is liable not only
for claims against himself, but also for those against the organization
of which he is a member if the assets of the organization are insufficient
to satisfy the claims of creditors. This is so regardless of the nature of
the claim and of any personal wrong on the part of the member." Thus,
to change from unlimited to limited liability, the second feature of a member's liability must be eliminated.
It would at first thought seem unquestionable that a professional
business trust could possess the characteristic of limited liability. Under
the Indiana Business Trust Act, i.e., "local law," a trust instrument may
provide for the same limitation of personal liability afforded stockholders
35. Ibid.
36. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1). Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (4), 28
Fed. Reg. 243 (1963) reads as follows:
A professional service organization has the corporate characteristic of limited
liability within the meaning of paragraph (d) of this section only if the personal
liability of its members is not greater in any aspect than that of shareholderemployees of an ordinary business corporation. If under local law and the rules
pertaining to professional practice, the liability of a professional person to the
clients or patients of the professional service organization is more extensive than
the personal liability of a shareholder-employee of an ordinary business corporation to its customers or patrons, the professional service organization lacks the
corporate characteristic of limited liability.
If this addition is adopted, it does not appear that any substantial alteration will be made
in the regulations as they now exist.
Under the INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 7701(8), "the term 'shareholder' includes a
member in an association, joint-stock company, or insurance company."
37. ABA Section of Taxation, Report of the Special Committee to Cooperate with
ABA Committee on Professional Ethics Re Associations of Attorneys Taxable as Corporations, ABA Taxation Bull., Oct. 1961, p. 41, at 51.
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of private corporations for profit." Moreover, under the common law
of business trusts, members are immune from personal liability. 9 Thus
if a business trust instrument provided that each lawyer-employee was
40
liable without limit for his own professional conduct including contract,
and was not personally liable for claims against the trust which had no
reference to his personal activities, this would permissibly limit liability
and satisfy the Treasury Regulations. But a question arises from the
requirement that trustees, who must be beneficiaries, may be liable for
some debts of the trust.
A business trust instrument may effectively exempt trustees from
personal liability for the contractualclaims and obligations of the trust if
the terms of the instrument become an integral part of the contracts entered into by the trustees for the organization.4 The instrument cannot,
however, exempt a trustee from personal liability for torts committed by
an employee of the trust, and it is irrelevant whether the tort was comIND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-4802(a) and 25-4808 (Burns Supp. 1963).
39. Annot., 156 A.L.R. 22, 107 (1945). "Where trustees of a business trust are
vested with title to the trust property and with the exclusive power to manage and conduct the affairs of the trust . . . the shareholders are not personally liable for the debts
or contractual obligations incurred by the trustee on behalf of the trust." The courts
seem to apply the same tests and principles to determine the liability of shareholders of
a business trust for torts. Id. at 113.
The common law of business trusts referred to throughout the remainder of this
note constitutes the common law of business trusts as it has developed in Massachusetts
and states which have followed the precedents of the Massachusetts courts; Such reference can be justified on three grounds: (1) The business trust originated in Massachusetts without enabling legislation and has reached its fullest development and most
extensive use in that state. Annot., 156 A.L.R. 22, 29 (1945) ; (2) Even though statutes
have been passed in Massachusetts concerning the business trust, these have been designed
to achieve state control over taxation and registration and have not affected or changed
the substantive law of business trusts. (See MAss. ANN. STAT. ch. 182 §§ 1 to 14 (Supp.
1962) ) ; (3) The rules of substantive law developed in Massachusetts form a substantial
majority position. Even though a few states have declined to follow the precedents of
the Massachusetts courts, they have felt obliged to acknowledge this majority position
and then reject it. For a discussion of the position of authority which Massachusetts
has held in formulating the common law rules of business trusts see Jones, Business
Trusts in Florida-Liabilityof Shareholders, 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1961).
40. Ordinarily an agent is not liable for the contractual obligations of the principal
but, according to Mechem, the agent and the principal may alter the terms of liability in
any manner they desire. MECHEm, AGENCY § 297 (4th ed. 1952).
41. The personal liability of the trustees of a business trust may be limited by
provision to that effect in the declaration of trust, if known and agreed to by
all the parties affected. . . . A provision of the trust instrument that persons
contracting with the trustees shall look to the trust property and not to the
trustees individually for the payment of any debts or obligations is held to have
the effect of exempting the trustee from individual liability under a contract
which he executed in his capacity as trustee, to one who was charged with
notice of the provision in the trust instrument.
Annot., 156 A.L.R. 22, 174 (1945). Under the Indiana Business Trust Act persons dealing
with the trust are charged with notice of the provisions of the trust instrument, so that
in the absence of particular ethical prohibitions, a trustee-member could be exempted
from contractual liability. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-4808 (Burns Supp. 1963).

38.
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mitted intentionally, negligently or without the fault of the trustee. 42 To
exempt a trustee from personal liability for employee torts would sanction an avoidance of the master-servant rule, and thus violate public
policy. 3 Because a member of every business trust would be subject to
personal liability, albeit as a trustee and not as a member, the question is
whether the Treasury Regulations could translate this fact into the characteristic of unlimited liability. Apparently neither the courts nor the IRS
have been troubled with the feature of a trustee's tort liability; the regulations specifically state that limited liability is a characteristic generally
common to both trusts and corporations, 4 and although no decisions have
been rendered by the courts under the 1960 regulations, the Supreme
Court ruled in Morrisey v. Commissioner" that the business trust there
involved possessed limited liability although its shareholders served as
trustees and were subject to tort liability.4 6
There is good reason to believe that the IRS will follow the line of
decisions handed down before the promulgation of the current regulations."
First, though the liability of business trusts is not completely
42. Fisheries Co. v. McCoy, 202 S.W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). This case is the
only one which has ruled on the trustees' liability for acts of agents in a business trust
where the creating instrument purported to exempt the trustee from liability. The concept
of trustee liability was adopted from regular trust law as set forth in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TRuSTS § 264, comments b and d (1959) :
Under the principle of respondeat superior, torts committed by the agents or
servants of the trustee in the course of administration subject the trustee to
liability to the same extent as though he were not trustee. . . . A provision in
the terms of the trust that the trustee shall not be personally liable for torts
committed in the administration of the trust is not effective to relieve the
trustee of liability.
The discussion of Fisheries Co. v. McCoy, supra, in Annot., 156 A.L.R. 22, 178 (1945)
implies that the rule adopted is not authority for business trust law since business
trusts are treated as partnerships in Texas. However, the Texas courts did not treat
the business trust as a partnership until three years after the case was decided. Other
writers have considered the decision of the Texas case as good precedent for trustee
liability in a business trust. See, e.g., Hildebrand, Liability of Trustees, Property and
Shareholders of A Massachusetts Trust, 2 TEXAs L. REv. 139 (1934), where the writer
asserts that "clearly the provision that the trustees shall not be liable for their own
torts, nor those of their agents, is nugatory." Id. at 149. "For this reason in every
declaration of trust a provision should be inserted authorizing the trustees to pay for
insurance against such tort liability as they can obtain, out of trust assets." Id. at 145.
See also WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION 860 (1929).
43. Fisheries Co. v. McCoy, supra note 42.
44. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2) (1960).
45. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
46. Id. at 361.
47. Rohrer v. United States, 275 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1960); Scofield's Estate v.
Commissioner, 266 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Reynolds v. Hill, 184 F.2d 294 (8th Cir.
1950); Titus v. United States, 150 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1945); United States v. Hill,
142 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1944); Keating-Snyder Trust v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 860
(5th Cir. 1942) ; Sears v. Hasset, 111 F.2d 961 (1st Cir. 1940) ; Pelton v. Commissioner,
82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936) ; Fowler v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. Mo. 1947).
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limited, it more closely resembles limited than unlimited liability. The
regulations recognize that the characteristic of transferability of interests
may take a modified form, and although the conclusion certainly could
not be termed irresistible, the IRS may allow the same modification of
limited liability.4 8

For the most part the trust is a separate entity, liable

as such, and the trustee's liability is only make-weight. Liability is not
an incidence of full and active ownership, so tax treatment of the organization as an independent taxable unit is justified. Second, the cases show
that it has been the Treasury Department, not the taxpayer, that has most
frequently demanded that an organization be classified as an association.
On these occasions the government has assessed a tax on the shareholders
and a delinquency against the "corporation." To rule that limited liability does not exist in a business trust would make it more likely that
no trust would qualify as an association. Certainly the enactment of
professional corporation and association statutes will result in an increase
in the number of organizations seeking classification as associations. In
that event it is probable that the loss of revenue through increased benefits which would result from that classification would not approach the
loss from a ruling that business trusts have unlimited liability, and thus
are taxable as a partnership. The most logical prediction as to the position which the IRS and the courts will take is that the personal tort liability of a trustee who is also a member of the business trust would not
destroy the characteristic of limited liability.
In considering the ethical propriety of practicing law with limited
liability, the most relevant question is not whether a lawyer may avoid
personal liability for his own conduct, for it is settled that he cannot, but
whether he can limit his liability for claims against the organization
which arise, e.g., from the personal misconduct of associates."9
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics specifically approves the partnership practice of law,"0 but the canon's history negates
any inference that the partnership is the only permissible form for practice. The canon was adopted to make it clear that American lawyers, unlike the English barristers who had not been allowed to practice in any
48. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (2) (1960).
49. ABA Section of Taxation, Report of the Special Committee to Cooperate with
ABA Committee on Professicmal Ethics Re Associations of Attorneys Taxable as Corporations,ABA Taxation Bull., Oct. 1961, p. 41, at 51; California State Bar Association,
Incorporation of Law Offices-Simmary of Report of Special Committees, 37 CALmF.
S.B.J. 473 (1962).
50. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 33 (1928) provides in part, that
"partnerships among lawyers for the practice of their profession are very common and
are not to be condemned."
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type of organization, could associate to practice law." Indeed the ABA
Committee has concluded it is not unethical to practice law under an
organizational structure embodying limited liability, provided each lawyer rendering legal services is personally responsible to his client, and
restrictions on the liability of other lawyers in the organization are made
apparent to the client.12 The necessary inference of the committee's pronouncement is that partnership law, not ethical standards, imposes joint
and several liability. Therefore, a business trust instrument which provides that each lawyer-employee is liable without limit for his own professional conduct in all dealings would meet the ethical requirements of
the legal profession. 3
If there is no ethical objection to limited liability itself, it is submitted that all other arguments against such liability which go to its effect
and are based on a general concept of legal ethics can be satisfied either
by the trustees' personal tort liability, or by providing in the trust instrument or requiring by state rule or statute that the business trust maintain
lawyer professional liability insurance.
The requirement for professional liability insurance would not be an
innovation. A Colorado Supreme Court rule requires all members of a
lawyer's corporation to be jointly and severally liable, except where the
corporation maintains lawyer professional liability insurance in accordance with certain minimum standards."' As might be expected many
object to compulsory liability insurance for the reasons that the lawyer
loses his right to determine the merit of a claim, the insurance company
receives the credit for paying the claim, insurance creates the impression
that lawyers need to be insured through a fear of valid claims and insurance companies may pay questionable claims which would erroneously
reflect upon the competence of the insured. 5 It should be pointed out
51. DRINIER, LEAL ETHICS 203, 204 (1953).
52. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, supra note 34, at 160.
The opinion discussed limited liability in connection with the ethical requirements of a
direct and personal relationship between attorney and client, an organization name which
would not be misleading, and of dividing fees between lawyers based on professional
responsibility.
53. Ibid.
54. Colo. Sup. Ct. (Civ.) R. ch. 19 § 231G requires professional corporations to
provide professional liability insurance in amounts of fifty thousand dollars for each
claim multiplied by the number of attorneys employed by the corporation. As an alternative a professional corporation may provide for an aggregate amount of insurance of
one hundred fifty thousand dollars multiplied by the number of attorneys serving the
organization. In no case, however, does the insurance need to exceed three hundred
thousand dollars per claim nor more than nine hundred thousand dollars a year aggregate.
55. See Sterling, A Debt of Hoior, 35 CALIF. S.B.J. 243 (1959); Curran, Profes-

sional Negligence: Some General Comments, in PROFESSI NAL NEGLIGENCE 9 (Roady &
Andersen ed. 1960) ; Hirsh, Medical Malpractice Insurance, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
144 (Roady & Andersen ed. 1960).
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that some of these objections are not solely applicable to professional
liability insurance, but rather apply to any type of insurance. The validity of these arguments must be balanced against the desirability of having
all lawyers adequately protected so that, in turn, the rights of the client
56

are secure.

For those lawyers who consider compulsory liability insurance objectionable, the fact that trustees who are normally the senior and most
affluent members of the firm have unlimited liability for the employee
torts, when added to the accessibility of the trust assets, should provide
adequate safeguards for the interests of persons dealing with professional
business trusts. Opinion 303 of the ABA Committee requires only that
restrictions on the liability of other lawyers in the organization be made
apparent to the client."
How does the existence of compulsory insurance or trustee tort liability affect the arguments leveled at the effects of limited liability? One
of the most frequently voiced objections to limited liability is that it may
shelter unscrupulous practitioners from liability in malpractice suits."s
Such a consequence is highly improbable. If a business trust attorney
engaged in misconduct while representing a client he would be personally
liable under the trust instrument.59 Although an insurance company
might absorb the pecuniary loss in the event the trust carried liability insurance, the attorney would nevertheless be subject to proper disciplinary
action by the state bar association. Moreover, if the dishonorable practitioner were a trustee of the business trust, he would be personally liable
in his trustee capacity. Finally, it might be thought that a lawyer could
find shelter from liability behind a business trust by conceiving of a
method to manage the trust without being trustee. Such a scheme would
not succeed for the characteristic of centralized management would be
56. It is not within the scope of this note to weigh the respective advantages and
disadvantages of compulsory liability insurance for all lawyers practicing law in business
trusts, but merely to point out to those advocates of compulsory insurance some of the
arguments which would have to be overcome before a plan of compulsory insurance could
be adopted.
57. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, supra note 34, at 160.
The opinion does not disclose how this limitation is to be made apparent to clients. It
is possible that it can be accomplished by including such letters as "Inc.," "P.A." (Professional Association) or "S.C." (Service Corporation) on all letterheads, contracts of
employment and billings. Initially, however, it is doubtful that the public would be
familiar enough with any designation except "Inc." to put them on notice of limited
liability. Thus, clients would have to be informed of that fact by the lawyer serving them.
58. Jones, Should Lawyers Inworporate?, 11 HASTINGs L.J. 150 (1959).
59. See the recommended provision for an attorney's liability for his own conduct
at note 40 supra and accompanying text. Such a provision interpreted in accordance with
IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-4808 (Burns Supp. 1963), would impose personal liability on an
attorney for any misconduct.
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lost, the trust treated as a partnership and all its members subject to unlimited liability." And where influence instead of control is used to improper ends, there always exists the threat of disbarment. 6'
The three remaining arguments against business trust practice because of limited liability can also be discounted. The first is that a client's contract would be with the business trust rather than the individual
lawyer, and hence the latter would not be personally liable for his conduct. 2 If privity of contract does make a difference in the obligation of
the lawyer toward his client, although this is extremely doubtful,6" the
trust instrument provision that all lawyer-employees are personally liable
in both contract and tort would preclude them from successfully asserting
freedom from liability. 4 Second, it has been contended that negligence
or misconduct would be more difficult to prove where a business trust is
involved." In answer it can only be said that proving the negligence or
misconduct of a lawyer has always been difficult," in large measure be60. In most jurisdictions shareholders of a business trust are not liable for trust
debts provided that they are neither vested with nor exercise substantial control over the
business of the trust. Jones, Bushess Trusts in Florida-Liability of Shareholders, U.
FLA. L. Rnv. 1, 17 (1961); Annot., 156 A.L.R. 22, 112 (1945). Because directing the
efforts of lawyers within a business trust is one of the primary duties of the trustees,
the usurpation of this authority by a non-trustee would allow a shareholder to control the
business and destroy the feature of limited liability. For a general discussion of the
"control test" in determining the liability of shareholders, see Annot., 156 A.L.R. 22, 42
(1945).
61. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 29 (1908) provides in part that
"lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the proper tribunals corrupt or
dishonest conduct in the profession, and should accept without hesitation employment
against a member of the Bar who has wronged his client." This canon should serve as a
partial guard against non-trustees influencing other members of a business trust since
Canon 29 has been interpreted to require a lawyer-employee to report any questionable
or unethical conduct of associates or superiors and to withdraw from that particular firm
if necessary. NEW YORK COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, Opinion 78, in DRINKER, LEoAl.
ETHICs 60 n.2 (1953).
62. Jones, supra note 58.
63. In one of the first reported cases in this country when a defendant in a malpractice suit asserted that unless there was a binding contract, he did not owe the
plaintiff the duty of counsel, Judge Roane replied: "The most complete answer . . . is
that the appellee undertook to conduct the suit, and in his management of it was guilty
of such a neglect of his duty as to subject the plaintiff to a loss; after this it is not
competent to him to allege a want of consideration." Stephens v. White, 2 Wash. 203, 210
(Va. 1796).
64. See note 40 supra.
65. Note, 75 HAv. L. REv. 776, 789 (1962). "Where more than a single lawyer
works on a client's problem, the client may have extreme difficulty in proving that any
particular one was negligent." See also, Bitker, Professional Associations and Federal
Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAx L. REv. 1, 10, 11 (1961).
66. In order to recover in a negligence action against an attorney it is necessary
to show that his negligence was the cause of legal damage to the client ...
It is in connection with negligence in the conduct of litigation that the question
of causation has presented its most difficult problems. Here the rule was developed that when the client lost his case he must show not only that the attorney was
negligent but also that the result would have been different except for the
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cause the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been held inapplicable to legal
malpractice claims,6 7 and business trust practice should create no
unique problems of discovery or proof. Finally, the concept of limited
liability might seem opposed to the profession's recent movement toward
self-assumed responsibility for the competence and conduct of all its members. Since 1955 the ABA has maintained a committee to study and promote the creation of clients' security funds to compensate those who have
suffered loss through the conduct of negligent, incompetent or dishonest
lawyers.68 The rationale for these funds is that lawyers want the general
public to consider all members of the profession competent and trustworthy; and, when losses are wrongfully visited on clients, lawyers should
take collective action to recapture the public's faith in their profession."
In view of the requirement that restrictions on the liability of associates
be made apparent to the client,7" one may ask whether lawyers who form
business trusts have impliedly disavowed their faith in fellow practitioners. The answer to that proposition is that limiting liability to gain
tax equality is not incompatible with professional responsibility. Each
lawyer seeking tax equality merely exchanges a personal tort responsibility for the obligation to contribute to client protection funds.
From this entire discussion of limited liability it is reasonable to
conclude that the liability of the trust, when added to the tort liability of
negligence. In other words, this involves a "suit within a suit," and the client
must show that he would have won the first suit as one step in order to win the
second one.
Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligeixe, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 231 (Roady
& Andersen ed. 1960).
67. Priest v. Dodsworth, 235 Ill. 613, 617, 85 N.E. 940, 942 (1909):
In a suit by a client against his attorney for damages charged to have resulted
from the negligent management of business, the 'burden is on the plaintiff to
prove the negligence charged. There is no presumption that an attorney has
been guilty of a want of care arising merely from his failure to be successful
in an undertaking. On the contrary, he is always entitled to the benefit of the
rule that every one is presumed to have discharged his duty, whether legal or
moral, until the contrary is made to appear. In a suit against an attorney for
negligence the burden is therefore on the plaintiff to allege and prove every
fact essential to establish defendant's duty and a violation of it.
Cited with approval in Olsen v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934). See also Pennington
Ex'rs. v. Yell, 11 Ark. 212, 228 (1850) ; 7 Am. JUR. Attorneys at Law § 188 (1963).
On occasion courts have relied upon the inapplicability of res ipsa loquitur in
negligence actions against attorneys to justify not applying res ipsa in malpractice claims
against doctors. Paulich v. Nipple, 104 Kan. 801, 180 Pac. 771 (1909). Although some
courts have made exceptions to this rule in the case of doctors, Ybarra v. Spangard, 25
Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1954), no cases were discovered where the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur has been applied to lawyers.
68. Sterling, supra note 55, at 244.
69. Id. at 104.
70. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, .tpra note 34, at 160.
For a discussion of how this limitation might be made apparent to clients see note 57 supra.
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trustees or a combination of trustees' tort liability and maintenance of
professional liability insurance, can adequately resolve the ethical objections to limited liability in a business trust.
CentralizedManagement
It is a difficult question whether a lawyer's business trust could
ethically possess the characteristic of centralized management required by
the Treasury Regulations, as that trait is conceived by the Internal Revenue Service. But the even more fundamental question of whether an
organization of attorneys could be so centrally managed as to satisfy the
common law of business trusts must first be resolved.
Business trust law requires trustees to exclusively manage their
trusts, and if a non-trustee member usurps the management power, the
organization is thereafter deemed a partnership."' This common
law rule has been said to allow trustees to delegate only duties of a ministerial or nondiscretionary nature to agents or servants, while requiring
them to retain exclusive authority to perform all discretionary acts." Of
course, if this statement accurately delineates the exclusive management
requirement, lawyers could never organize in business trust form; virtually all acts performed by non-trustee members would require some discretion because of the very nature of professional conduct. But authorities
have said that the absence or presence of discretion is not solely determinative of the power to delegate a particular function to employees." Professor Bogert is of the opinion that courts have in actuality asked only
whether the particular delegation would have been made by a reasonably
prudent man under similar circumstances, 4 and the Restatement of
71. See note 60 supra.
72. It should be noted that the common law rules as to centralized management and
delegation of discretionary functions are separate and distinct. Thus, allowing a nontrustee shareholder to perform managerial functions would not violate the common law
proscription against delegation of discretionary functions since that rule exists solely
for the protection of the beneficiaries. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 555 (2d ed.
1960). Nevertheless, the general strictures of the delegation doctrine are helpful in
delineating the scope of the centralized management requirement.
73. 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 171.2 (2d ed. 1956) ; 2 BOGERT, op. cit supra note 72, § 555.
74. In reality the courts have asked themselves whether, if the act which the
trustee has to perform were to be done by the average man of business with
regard to his own property but with the motives similar to the trust motives
in mind, that business man would consider the act so important and so within
his capacity that he must do it personally, or would treat it as one which he
could reasonably leave to a servant, agent or a specialist. If the hypothetical
business man, in view of the character of the act and his own qualifications for
doing it would take direct personal control of the fuction, then the courts expect
the trustee to do likewise; but if the business man would employ an outside
expert or use a regularly employed agent or servant, then the trustee is given
similar liberty.

Ibid.
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Trusts impliedly recognizes that position.5

Thus, the common law does

not automatically foreclose the issue of whether lawyers may practice in
a business trust.
One solution is simply to conclude that when a legislature authorizes
formation of business trusts for a particular purpose, it at the same time
sanctions the delegation of any authority reasonably necessary to the
functioning of the trust for the permitted purpose. Thus, since business
trusts have been authorized in Indiana for the practice of professions,
the professions must be permitted such centralized management as will
not offend their respective ethical requirements. But because an equally
compelling inference is that the legislature left the question of the availability of the business trust as a form for professional practice to the
ethics committees of each profession and, in the case of attorneys, to the
judiciary as well, it is necessary to consider the impact of the ethical canons upon the central management characteristic.
The common law requirement of centralized management seems incompatible with the traditional concept of the lawyer's self-reliance, integrity and personal responsibility to his clients." The principle embodied
in Canon 31 that lawyers must be free to exercise their own judgment in
legal matters, has been an integral part of the canons of ethics since their
adoption in 1908 and would perhaps, standing alone, proscribe centralization of management. But in Opinion 303 the ABA Committee stated
that Canon 31 was designed to prevent non-lawyers from controlling the
work of a lawyer, not to prevent one lawyer directing another. As
long as the organization or its managers are all lawyers, centralized management would not violate Canon 31." It appears that the committee has
expressly sanctioned a practice indulged in by nearly all law partnerships
throughout the country-some lawyers do direct the efforts of other lawyers. In today's law firm most partnership agreements provide for firm
management by either a single partner or a central management commit75.

See the RESTATEMENT

(SEcOND),

TRUSTS

§

171(d) (1959).

76. No lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person
who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment.
Every lawyer upon his own responsibility must decide what employment he -will
accept as counsel, what causes he will bring into Court for plaintiffs, what
cases he will contest in court for defendants.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIaCS, Canon 31 (1908). Only one minor change has
been made in this canon since its adoption. The word "employment" was substituted for
the word "business" in 1937. For a history of the Canons of Professional Ethics and the
way in which they have been changed since their adoption in 1908 see DRiNKER, LEGAL

ETHIcs (1953).
77. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, supra note 34, at 161.
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tee.78 There would seem to be no difference between law partnerships in
which some partners have management responsibility, and business trusts
where trustees would make such decisions.7
But the statement of opinion 303 is troublesome because of its seemingly unqualified position that there is nothing ethically wrong in allowing one lawyer to control the efforts of another lawyer. One can certainly contemplate situations when the directions of a lawyer-trustee
would be contrary to the best interests of a client, and at that point the
lawyer-employee is faced with a difficult decision which may be resolvable only by his leaving the organization. Such a situation could of
course occur in an orthodox partnership as well. Opinion 303 probably
means that there is nothing inherently improper in one lawyer controlling
the efforts of another lawyer, and when questionable situations arise they
will be judged on the facts rather than by an unqualified rule.
It is submitted, however, that the common law requirement of centralized management would not require trustees of a business trust to
direct every effort of member-attorneys. One authority has persuasively
contended that the type of decisions which the lawyer must make in his
everyday handling of cases would merely execute business within the
general policy decisions of the central management committee."0 The
trustees would make those decisions necessary to control the organization, vi--., determining what clients to represent in cases with conflicting
interests, the types of cases to handle, formulating standards for hiring
staff attorneys, fxing salaries, the percentages of members and granting
bonuses, administering promotion schemes, supervising the keeping of
records and confidential information, insuring the highest standards of
conduct and carrying out programs of continuing legal education for
lawyer-employees. In terms of the entire scope of the business trust many
78.

CARRINGTON

&
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(1961), a pamphlet prepared for the American Bar Association Standing Committee on
Economics of Law Practice. The source material for this pamphlet was gathered from
124 partnership agreements under which law firms were operating throughout the
country. The firms from which the agreements were acquired were law firms recognized
as outstanding leaders of the bar in their respective states. A special effort was made to
obtain agreements from small partnerships in order to gain a representative picture of
all types of law firms. Approximately forty per cent of the agreements examined came
from law firms having seven or less members.
79. Ohl, Corporate Practice of Law in New York, 40 TAXES 263, 285 (1962). "The
fact of business life today is that in all large firms the multiplicity of necessary activities
requires that they be dealt with by less than all of the group if the firm's end results
are to be competitive with today's form of doing business. If legal theory were put into
actual practice, to wit, that everyone did a part of everything, the only result would be
confusion confounded."
80. Ohl, note 79 supra, at 284. The enumeration in the text is partially based upon
Ohl's comments.
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of these decisions would be necessary for exclusive management authority
in the trustees, but would not necessarily include the power to direct the
handling of each case in a particular manner.8 If Professor Bogert has
correctly delineated the common law strictures on delegation of discretionary functions, the right of a lawyer to make independent decisions in
his everyday work would not violate the trustees' management prerogatives. But whether a professional business trust can satisfy the centralized management concepts of the IRS is another matter.
Under the Internal Revenue Code "centralized management means
the concentration of continuing exclusive authority to make independent
business decisions on behalf of the organization which do not require
ratification by members of such organization." This exclusive authority
must be vested in a managing body of fewer than all the organization's
members, who are periodically elected or are a self-perpetuating body.83
The Treasury Regulations do not give examples of the management
decisions necessary to constitute exclusive authority, but only admonish
that centralized management will not exist when the central authority
performs nothing more than ministerial acts. 4 However, in the unreported Colony Medical Group ruling, 8 the Director of the Tax Rulings
Division considered the degree of control that had to be exercised over
a doctor working for an organization to satisfy the requirements of centralized management. The division held that the facts and circumstances
had to be considered on a case by case basis and that the emphasis of
employer-employee relationship for a professional person shifts from the
question of the right to supervise specific details to the degree of control
exercised over general policies and standards of performance.8" If this
ruling manifested the service's present attitude toward satisfying the centralized management characteristic, unquestionably lawyers could meet
81. Id. at n.13 and accompanying text.
82. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (c) (2) (1960).

83.

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1) (1960).

84.

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (3)

(1960).

85. 617 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 1 6375; 625 CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAx
REP. f 4939.23. The private ruling was rendered in the form of a letter dated March 2,
1961 signed by John W. S. Littleton, Director, Tax Rulings Division.

86. Because of the nature of professions the following factors are to be considered
in determining whether or not a professional practitioner is subject to centralized management:
(1) the degree to which such individual has become integrated into the operating organization of the employer; (2) the substantial nature, regularity and
continuity of his work for the employer; (3) the authority vested in or reserved by the employer to require compliance with his general standards and
policies; and (4) the degree to which the individual under consideration has
been accorded the rights and privileges of other clearly recognized employees.

NOTES

that condition to taxation as an association; it would be satisfied for the
same reasons as the common law requirement. But the seemingly receptive
attitude of the IRS has proved gravely misleading in light of the proposed
amendments to Section 301.7701-2 of the Treasury Regulations. 7 They
prescribe nine decisions over which managers of a professional association must have "continuing exclusive authority" for centralized management:
(i) the hiring and firing of professional members of the organization and its professional and lay employees, (ii) the compensation of the members and of such employees, (iii) the
conditions of employment-such as working hours, vacation
periods, and sick leave, (iv) the persons who will be accepted
as clients or patients, (v) who will handle each individual
case or matter, (vi) the professional policies and procedures to be followed in handling each individual case, (vii) the
fees to be charged by the organization, (viii) and the nature of
the records to be kept, their use, and their disposition, and (ix)
the times and amounts of distributions of the earnings of the
organization to its members as such. 8
In its proposed regulations the IRS has referred to the possible conflict of interest which could arise were one lawyer to directly control the
efforts of another in his everyday practice, and asserts that even if a professional association could establish some measure of centralized management, the traditional responsibility of a practitioner to his client precludes
any professional association from possessing centralized management
under the code." Not only has the IRS prescribed a list of decisions
whose apparent purpose is to flatly deny professional associations the
characteristic of centralized management, but it has attempted to foreclose any discussion and resolution of the ethical problems by concluding
that centralized management cannot be attained in any such association
87.

Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, -2, 28 Fed. Reg. 243 (1963).

88.

Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (3), 28 Fed. Reg. 243 (1963).

89. Moreover, although a measure of central control may exist in a professional service corporation, the managers of a professional service corporation
in which a member retains traditional professional responsibility cannot have
the continuing exclusive authority to determine all of the matters described in
the preceding sentence. Instead, such measure of central control is no more
than that existing in an ordinary large professional partnership which has one
or more so-called managing partners and in which a member retains the
traditional professional autonomy with respect to professional decisions and the
traditional responsibility of a professional person to the client or patient.
Such measure of central control is essentially different from the centralization
of management existing in an ordinary business corporation.
Ibid.
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because of professional ethics.90 The service claims that any measure of
centralized management in a professional association is equivalent to that
in the traditional large partnership, and is essentially different from that
of an ordinary corporation." This position recognizes neither the broad
scope of centralized management which exists in today's law partnerships, nor the fact that partnership management directs litigation without
creating ethical crises for its members and associates. Perhaps the IRS
should concentrate on objective standards and leave the determination of
lawyers' ethical ability to meet them to the ethics committees.
The fate of the proposed regulations is uncertain, but even should
they not be adopted the conservative view they mirror must be considered
by lawyers assessing the benefits of a professional business trust. There
is little doubt that lawyers' management of associates by stipulating the
"policies and procedures to be followed in handling each case," and determining the "fees to be charged by the organization," would violate the
canons of ethics. The ability of lawyers to ethically satisfy the regulations' centralized management requirement as now conceived by the IRS
will therefore depend almost exclusively on an interpretation of the words
"continuing exclusive authority" to make such decisions. If the trustees
are required to make each and every one of the decisions enumerated in
the proposals, the requirement of centralized management will violate the
ethics of the legal profession. If, on the other hand, the trustees of a
business trust organized to practice law are required to make the controlling decisions only when a conflict of interest arises, centralized
management will not transgress those ethics.9"
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid. The precise meaning of the terms "continuing exclusive authority" is
subject to question and their interpretation may cast considerable doubt upon the
reasonableness with which the list of decisions for centralized management has been
devised. If continuing exclusive authority is interpreted to mean that these decisions
must be made by no one other than the managers of a professional association, the IRS
has imposed requirements upon professional associations which none but the smallest
of corporations can meet and which seem to be totally inconsistent with the entire
history of associations. For example, it seems naive to even intimate that the board of
directors of a medium-sized corporation makes the decision to hire and fire every
person employed by the organization or the compensation each employee will receive.
It seems even more naive to suppose that the board of directors will determine the
persons who will be accepted as clients of the organization, the procedures to be
followed in each business deal embarked upon by the corporation, the price to be
exacted in each case, and the nature of the records to be kept concerning all transactions. To require this would place an impossible burden upon the board of directors.
If, on the other hand, "continuing exclusive authority" is interpreted to mean that
the power to make these decisions must rest with the managers, but that their exercise
of that power is largely in reviewing actions of delegates and that in the case of
conflict, the decision of the managers is controlling, the decisions listed in the proposed
regulations are not unreasonable.

NOTES
Free Transferabilityof Interests
In general, for an organization to have free transferability of interests under the Internal Revenue Code, each one of its members must
"have the power, without the consent of other members, to substitute for
themselves in the same organization, a person who is not a member of
the organization. . . . [T] he members must be able without the consent
of other members to confer all the attributes of his interest in the organization." 3 The regulations recognize that a modified form of free transferability, though it will be accorded less weight than unrestricted transferability, will suffice.9 4 Such a modified form would exist, e.g., if a
member could transfer his interest in the association only after having
offered it to other members at its fair market value. 5 The attributes of
membership in an association which are generally transferred are the
right to share in the profits, to vote in the election of management and,
in business trust arrangements, the ability to become a trustee. The
unique transferable interest held by members of a professional business
trust would be the right to be employed.9"
The Indiana Business Trust Act (local law) presents no obstacle to
the free transferability of trust interests; it expressly allows either restricted or unrestricted transferability."
Without question, the characteristic of unmodified free transferability of interests would violate several of the lawyer's ethical precepts. Canon 33 prohibits partnerships of
lawyers and non-lawyers, and certainly this prohibition would apply to
business trusts. Substitution of a non-lawyer as a shareholder of a business trust would necessarily violate that canon, and because the substitution would entitle the non-lawyer to a share of the trust's proceeds obtained from legal fees, Canon 34 would be violated as well. Furthermore,
a non-lawyer who exercised the voting right of a member could indirectly
control the efforts of lawyers employed by the trust, thus violating Canons
93. Treas. Reg. § 301 .7701-2(e) (1960).
94. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2) (1960).
95. Ibid.
96. Under the proposed regulations an additional attribute of a member's interest
is the right to employment by the organization:
The right of a member of a professional service organization to share in its
profits is generally dependent upon the existence of an employment relationship
between him and the organization. In such case, free transferability of interests
within the meaning of paragraph (e) of this section exists only if the member,
without the consent of other members, may transfer both the right to share
in the profits of the organization and the right to an employment relationship
with the organization.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (5) (i), 28 Fed. Reg. 243 (1963).
97. IN D. ANN. STAT. § 25-4802(a) (Burns Supp. 1963).
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31 and 35.98 Also, the non-lawyer might have access to confidential client files while not restrained by the ethical standards of the bar as to
nondisclosure of personal information, a violation of Canon 3 7 .9" Finally, if a non-lawyer could acquire interests in a trust, what formerly
was a professional organization would be transformed into a mere lay
agency. For a lawyer to practice in such an organization holding itself
out as a professional business trust would be to aid the unauthorized
practice of law, and would violate Canon 47.1"'
To satisfy the ethics of the legal profession therefore, the professional business trust must not allow a member's beneficial interest to
permanently fall into the hands of a layman.'9 1 All the relevant canons
98. "Every lawyer upon his own responsibility must decide what employment he
will accept as counsel, what causes he will bring into court for plaintiffs, what cases he
will contest in court for defendants." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon

31 (1908). Similarly, ABA

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,

Canon 35 (1928)

pro-

vides that "the professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited
by any lay agency, personal or corporate which intervenes between the client and
lawyer. . . . He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties
by or in the interest of such intermediary." A lawyer who was a member of an
organization which also had non-lawyer members would place himself in a position to
accept directions from non-lawyers as to the course of conduct he should pursue for
his client, thus violating both of these canons.
99. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 37 (1928) provides in part:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his clients' confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees; and
neither of them should accept employment which involves or may involve the
disclosures or use of these confidences, either for the private advantage of the
lawyer or his employees or to the disadvantage of the client, without his
knowledge apd consent, and even though there are other available sources of
such information.
100. "No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name to be used in
aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency, personal or corporate." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 47 (1937).
101. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Opinion 303, 48
A.B.A.J. 159 (1961). There are times, of course, when a lawyer's interest cannot avoid
passing into the hands of non-lawyers:
When lawyers die their property interests must pass to someone. The enforcement of creditor's claims against lawyers leads to the transfer of their property
interests. Incompetence of lawyers calls for the administration of their holdings
by a conservator or guardian. In each of these instances, and in others of a
related kind, a non-lawyer may take over the control of the lawyer's property
interest. If the professional association or professional corporation recognizes
the transferability of a lawyer-member's interest to persons other than lawyers
only for a limited purpose of the administration of the lawyer's property
holdings on death, incompetence, bankruptcy, etc., and requires that in a limited
period of time his interests must be transferred to a lawyer or lawyers, no
violation of the Canons of Ethics is present because of the presence of this
limited transferability, provided, non-lawyers who acquire an interest under
these limited circumstances are not entitled to access to the confidences of any
client and have no voice in the management of the association or corporation
and cannot participate in any distributions based on fees earned during such
limited period.

NOTES
and the Treasury Department's requirement of free transferability of interests could be met by a system of modified transferability similar to that
often found in close corporations with options to purchase first in the
trust, second in the beneficiaries pro rata, third as the beneficiaries can
and will purchase, fourth, opportunity to sell to outside lawyers and finally a requirement that the trust and beneficiaries purchase the otherwise unsold shares at a reasonable price."0 2
Even if the trust restricted the transfer of members' shares to lawyers, troublesome ethical problems are raised by Canon 34 which prohibits
the division of fees among lawyers on any basis except as compensation
for responsibility assumed or services rendered. While practicing lawyers can clearly divide fees, it is unclear what constitutes the assumption
of responsibility for the purpose of sharing in fees. The ABA Committee has classified this question one of law, and thus has refused advisory opinions on the matter;... but it has indicated that supervision and
control will be important factors in finding the responsibility which would
permit sharing in fees.'
It is probable that sharing fees on the basis of
102. ABA

COMMIITTEE ON

PROFFSSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, Opinion 266,

in

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, OPINIONS OF COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 552 (1957).

In accomplishing the resale of shares of a lawyer-member, the value of the share
may not include compensation for his proportionate part of the good will of the firm.
"The good will of the practice of a lawyer is not . . . of itself an asset either he or
his estate can sell." Ibid. Therefore, to avoid a violation of legal ethics and at the
same time compensate a lawyer for his real worth to the business trust, an organization could provide for a periodic adjustment in the number of shares owned by
members, reflecting both the capital assets of the firm and the responsibility assumed
by each member.
103. ABA COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, Opinion 63, in
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, OPINIONS OF COMMITTEE ON PROFES-

SIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 159 (1957) : "The committee does not express opinions
concerning questions of law. . . . Ordinarily no ethical problem is involved in such a
controversy." Relying upon the basis of this opinion the committee later held that "it is
not the province of this committee to measure the services rendered or responsibility
assumed or incurred by the respective lawyers." Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, supra note 101.
The committee did speak to the question of responsibility in its Opinion 303 and
said:
All lawyers within an organization bear a professional responsibility for the
legal services of the organization whether they are under any personal liability
for all of such services or not. This general professional responsibility of all,
though legal liability is limited, prevents any violation of Canon 34, when
lawyers in the organization are entitled to share in the fees collected without
regard to whether they personally participated in the rendition of legal services.
ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, supra note 101, at 160.
Although this portion of the opinion concludes that being within the organization does
constitute sufficient responsibility for a division of fees, it avoids the crucial issue of
what acts are sufficient to bring a lawyer "within the organization."
104. The extent of the service rendered, if any, or of the responsibility, if any,
incurred or assumed by a lawyer . . . may vary in particular cases, depending
in no small degree, upon whether the client was advised that other counsel

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
mere ownership and the exercise of voting rights would not escape the
proscriptions of Canon 34, for the underlying purpose of the canon is to
prohibit attorneys from sharing in fees collected by others for which they
rendered no legal services." 5 This conclusion would seem justified even
though the same ownership by a layman would give him such control as
to render the association "nonprofessional." Thus, to share in the fees
collected by the business trust, attorneys would have to engage in additional activities, and any conduct which fairly evidenced an employment
relationship between the trust and member would probably satisfy Canon
34.10
Moreover, once responsibility is established in conformity with
ABA standards, it may be expected that courts would not insure that
salary perfectly reflects the amount of responsibility assumed." 7 That
would require the impossible task of policing all agreements. Since each
lawyer may withdraw from an organization if he feels that the division
of fees does not properly reflect responsibility, courts as a practical matter will have to assume the division proper unless proven excessively
should be retained, whether the retainer or selection was made with or without
the client's request or approval, and whether supervision or control was received
or maintained as to the acts or conduct of the retained lawyer. . . . The
implication of these elements are obvious and may determine the existence and
measure, or non-existence, of "responsibility" within the meaning of Canon 34.
ABA COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, Opinion 204 in CANONS
OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, OPINIONS
ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 415 (1957).
105. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 186 (1953). If

OF COMMITTEE ON

PROFESSIONAL

these acts are not sufficient to
constitute supervision or control and a violation of ethics results from dividing fees
on such a basis, it may be necessary to require all retired lawyers to retransfer their
shares to the business trust. The possible violation of ethics seems somewhat more
remote in the case of retired lawyers than in the case of a lawyer who does no more
than invest money in a business trust. A common practice of law firms is to retain
senior retired partners for consultation and to provide them with an office to conduct
activities on a part time basis if they so choose. See CARRINGTON & SUTHERLAND, supra
note 78, at 69. If a retired partner is not retained on such a basis, a procedure could
be established for gradual retirement where shares would be retransferred to the trust.
Under a gradual retirement program, a lawyer would sell a portion of his shares at
one year intervals until he no longer owned shares at the time of retirement. An
alternative or supplementary method would be to reduce the salary paid to a retiring
lawyer so that, in part, the amount of money received would reflect the service to the
law firm.
106. The IRS has arrived at the same conclusion in the proposed amendments to
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960). After defining employment relationship "to include
any active participation in the conduct of the organization," Proposed Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2(h) (2), 28 Fed. Reg. 243 (1963), it concludes that "the right of a member
of a professional service organization to share in its profits is generally dependent upon
the existence of an employment relationship between him and the organization." Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (5) (i), 28 Fed. Reg. 243 (1963).
107. In Indiana a proceeding may be brought in any circuit or superior court to
revoke the admission of an attorney to the bar for wilfully violating the duties of an
attorney as prescribed by statute, or for wilfully violating his oath. IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 4-3614 (Burns 1946). Additionally, disbarment proceedings may be initiated as original
actions in the supreme court. IND. SUP. CT. R. 3-21.

NOTES
disproportionate." 8
In addition to satisfying ethics, modified transferability should also
meet existing Treasury Regulations. But again the newly proposed regulations becloud the picture. They would deny the characteristic of free
transferability of interests to professional association by simply declaring
that transferable "interests" within the code do not include the right of
employment and the duties inherent in professional trust management,
when the trust or beneficiaries have options to purchase the shares being
sold.'" This construction of the code utterly defies logic and rational
analysis. When employment is an incident of ownership there seems to
be no reason why it should have to be more easily transferred than the
right to dividends. The power of the trustees to hire and fire is limited
to non-members, except when the trust would buy a member's shares and
reissue them to a new member. This power constitutes a small encroachment upon the characteristic of centralized management, but does not prevent a member's employment relationship from being transferred or called
in as his ownership might be. It is doubtful that this arbitrary distinction in the proposals will be incorporated within the regulations, but
should it be, it is submitted that courts would not feel bound to accept it.
One writer has suggested that free transferability of interests in a
professional association is ludicrous in light of all the restrictions which
professional ethics would require be imposed upon the transfer of
shares."' This contention more directly approaches the question than the
IRS proposals which concentrate on a single factor presumably making
transferability of interests impossible. Nevertheless, a restraint on alienation does not exist when an owner can reasonably divest himself of
property and obtain a fair price for it. Under a system of options to buy
and sell the owner of the trust certificate is assured of transferring it for
a fair price within a reasonable time which should qualify the property
as sufficiently transferable. There is no reason to view transferability
from the standpoint of a prospective buyer.
Continuity of Life
An organization possesses continuity of life when it cannot under lo108. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, supra note 104.
109. Although a so-called right of first refusal in connection with the transfer
of the interest of a shareholder of an ordinary business corporation may not
prevent a modified form of transferability of interests within the meaning of
paragraph (e) of this section, such right of first refusal applies only to the
right to share in the profits and assets of the enterprise.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (5) (ii), 28 Fed. Reg. 243 (1963).

110. Bitker, Professional Associations and Federal ixome Taxatio: Some
Questions and Comments, 17 TAx L. REv. 1 (1961).
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cal law be dissolved through the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement or
expulsion of any member."' Dissolution is "an alteration of the identity
of an organization by reason of a change in the relationship between its
members as determined under local law."' 2 Under the Indiana Business
Trust Act the legal existence of the trust is controlled by its creating instrument unless the board of trustees votes to terminate the trust."' So
long as the trust instrument provides for the continuing existence of the
business trust, the power of the trustees to dissolve the organization
would not prevent satisfying the present regulations' requirement of continuity of life.
But the proposed Treasury Regulations would not allow the same
conclusion. The IRS now takes the position that for an organization to
have continuity of life, it must not be subject to dissolution upon the
withdrawal of a member-beneficiary because of (1) operation of the
law, (2) applicable regulation or (3) professional ethics."14 Unlike partnerships, a professional business trust would not by a member's withdrawal dissolve by operation of law." 5 However, without providing in
the trust instrument or by subsequent agreement for a system of options
to buy and sell shares of withdrawing members, shares might fall into the
hands of non-lawyers and require dissolution by lawyer-members to avoid
ethical conflicts. Thus, the lawyer's business trust continues its life by
agreement, and not by operation of law. The IRS would equate for tax
purposes such an organization which continues in law by its agreement to continue in fact, to the partnership which the law may dissolve
and its agreement continue.
The different aspects of continuity which the two agreements provide, however, are obvious. While mere de facto continuity, tested only
at infrequent intervals of membership withdrawal, would be a tenuous
and insufficient basis of continuity to warrant characterization as a
separate entity for taxation purposes, the professional business trust with
its armor of options and guarantees for buying and selling members' in111. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1960).
112. Ibid.
113. INDm.
ANN. STAr. § 25-4811 (Burns Supp. 1963).
114. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(2), 28 Fed. Reg. 243 (1963).

115. It may 'be stated as a general rule that unless the trust instrument so

provides, the death of one or more shareholders of a business trust does not
have the effect of dissolving or terminating the organization. The perpetuity
of the organization notwithstanding the death of members or the transfer of

interests, is one of the fundamental characteristics of such trusts and one of
their chief advantages.
Annot., 156 A.L.R. 22, 209 (1945).

NOTES
terests is suited from its inception to continue life interminably.11 While
an agreement governing the relationships between members is necessary
to continuity, the business trust is not only like the corporation in its desire and ability to continue as a legal entity, but the experiences of large
law partnerships prove that a continued existence in fact would result.
The professional business trust therefore could possess a modified form
of continuity of life, and whether the IRS is justified in its position to
deny that fact any significance for tax purposes is questionable. The
resolution of this issue must await a determination of the proposed regulations' fate.
As to the ethics of continuity of life in a professional association,
because that characteristic necessarily involves transferability of interests,
the majority of the ethical problems which it could raise have been discussed. The one independent ethical problem posed by continuity of life
arises over use of a firm name for a lawyer's business trust. Canon 33
prohibits a judge's name in a firm title, and in certain cases the name of a
deceased. As shares are transferred during the life of a trust it may become necessary to change its name to avoid unethical practice. But such
changes would not affect the identity of the organization under Indiana
law; its legal existence would be unaltered."'
III.

MISCELLANEOUS ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Profit Sharing Plans and Death Benefits
Among all of the tax benefits achieved from classification as an association only profit sharing, retirement and death benefit plans seem to
raise ethical questions for attorneys. The Internal Revenue Code specifies that profit sharing and pension plans, to receive favorable tax treatment, must not be created and administered so as to discriminate in favor
of management employees."' Because the code would therefore require
the plans of a professional business trust to encompass both its profes116. It is conceivable that the remaining members of a business trust might, when
a particular transfer is to be made, refuse both to exercise the right of first refusal
and to employ the successor in interest causing the dissolution of the trust. In such a
situation it can be said that the continued existence of the trust is dependent upon the
willingness of the remaining members to accept one of the two alternatives as is
asserted in the proposed regulations. It is questionable whether the IRS in its proposed
regulations attached any significance to this fact. Nonetheless, it should be noted the
possibility of dissolution in this manner is extremely remote, and to assert that it
prevents a professional business trust from achieving continuity of life would be to
give it undue emphasis.
117. Miles Lamp Chimney Co. v. Erie Fire Ins. Co., 164 Ind. 181, 73 N.E. 107
(1904); Philapy v. Aukuma-Bright Lumber Co., 56 Ind. App. 266, 105 N.E. 161
(1914) ; State Exch. Bank v. Paul, 58 Ind. App. 487, 108 N.E. 532 (1915).
118. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401(a)3(A), (B), and 401(a) (4).
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sional and non-professional employees, the question arises whether payment under the plans would constitute a "salary" paid out of net profits,
and thereby violate Canon 34 as interpreted in the ABA Committee's
Opinion 303.119

There is no doubt that a conventional non-retirement profit sharing
plan covering non-lawyer employees would violate Canon 34 as an unethical division of fees from legal services. This result, however, would
hardly seem justified for retirement plans. Indeed, if profit sharing retirement plans are unethical, the lawyer will be surprised to learn that he
cannot utilize either the professional association or the Self-Employed
Individuals Tax Retirement Act.'
Canon 34 was designed to prevent
laymen from soliciting business for a share of the fees from legal services
gained through their efforts.'
Since the benefits of retirement profit
sharing plans are delayed for many years, it is hard to envision the secretarial help of a lawyer's business trust influencing friends to engage the
trust to increase retirement income. Two writers have asserted that if the
committee in Opinion 303 intended to declare profit sharing retirement
22
plans ethically objectionable, they are "just plain wrong on the point.'
119. An organization practicing law may employ many non-lawyers. The
source of funds to pay them for their services will be fees for legal services
rendered. The use of the fees to pay agreed salaries to non-lawyer employees
of course is not a violation of Canon 34. However, if the salary of a nonlawyer employee is to be based on a percentage of the net profits, a division
of fees for legal services would be involved and Canon 34 would prohibit it.
Thus if a professional association or professional corporation is organized to
practice law and it is approved as a corporation for federal tax purposes, it
would not be ethically proper for it to have a profit sharing plan if nonlawyers were included as beneficiaries of the plan.
ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, supra note 101, at 161.
120. ABA Section of Taxation, Report of the Special Committee to Cooperate
with ABA Committee on Professional Ethics Re Associations of Attorneys Taxable as
Corporations,ABA Taxation Bull., Oct. 1961, P. 41, at 53.
121. Fruetal & Frost, Why Lawyers Should Have the Right to Practice if Corporate Form, 37 CALIF. S.B.J. 874, 887 (1962). "The underlying purpose of Canon 34
is to avoid the temptation to solicit business by a layman who expects to share in the
legal fees resulting from such solicitation."
122. It has also been said that splitting fees with a layman opens the door
to the unlawful practice of law by laymen or disbarred attorneys. It seems
ridiculous to suggest that a bookkeeper or legal secretary would be motivated
to solicit business for her employer or to practice law because his contribution
to a profit-sharing retirement plan in which she participates is based upon a
percentage of profits rather than a fixed amount per year. Moreover, the
contributions pursuant to a profit-sharing retirement plan, although contingent
upon profits, are merely a method of funding the plan, the proceeds of which
are distributable only upon retirement, death or earlier termination of service.
Assuming a law partnership has a history of earning a certain level of profits
and then adopts a profit-sharing retirement plan, the contributions to which
are well within its historic level of profits, it would seem that the inclusion
of lay personnel in such a profit-sharing retirement plan would no more be a
violation of Canon 34 than would be the payment of fixed salary or fixed
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But until the committee clarifies its position as to the meaning of "salary," lawyers may be reluctant to create profit sharing retirement plans
for tax advantages.
The ethical propriety of a death benefit paid to the estate or beneficiary of a deceased trust member may also be questioned as a sharing
of fees with non,-lawyers. Opinion 308 of the ABA Committee approved
the payment of a death benefit to a deceased lawyer's estate from partnership assets.128 The committee ruled that as long as the amount and
method of payment Were determined prior to death, and it constituted
either delayed compensation or an approximation of the decedent's interest at time of death, the payment would not violate professional
ethics. 2 4 Such payments by a lawyer's business trust could be expected
to receive similar approval.
General Objections
From all the foregoing discussions it is reasonably certain that an
association which observes the proper safeguards in establishing corporate characteristics and is seeking tax benefits, can practice law in a
business trust without violating the Canons of Legal Ethics. At the
same time many of the objections which have been posed against the
corporate practice of law are not based on any specific canon, but rather
on general policy. An attempt will be made to evaluate at least a major
portion of these arguments.
The Indiana Supreme Court has joined with most other state courts
in ruling that the practice of law is restricted to natural persons as a protection to the public, upon the apparent presumption that a corporation is
not deserving of the same personal trust as a person."' But this argubonus payments out of an expected level of fees.
Ibid.
123. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Opinion 308, 49
A.B.A.J. 893 (1963). The question submitted to the committee was raised by a recommended provision of a partnership agreement in CARRINGTON & SUTHERLAND, supra note
78, at 55. The provision entitled the estate of the deceased or his survivors to
a series of forty-two consecutive monthly installments, beginning on or before
one hundred twenty days after the date of his death, a further amount which
(except as otherwise herein provided) shall be the average of the sums paid
to him as a partner of the firm during each of the last three complete fiscal
years of the firm during which he was a partner.

Ibid.

124. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Opinion 308, 49

A.B.A.J. 893 (1963).

125. "The practice of law is restricted to natural persons who have been licensed
upon the basis of established character and competence as a protection to the public
against lack of knowledge, skill, integrity and fidelity." Groninger v. Fletcher Trust

Co., 220 Ind. 202, 207, 41 N.E.2d 140, 141 (1942).
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ment is result-reaching and its proponents refuse to examine the nature
of professional corporations and associations. As long as all an association's members are lawyers the entire organization is indirectly, if not
directly, subject to the control of the courts. Simply because a lawyer is
employed by a non-lawyer he is not excused from observing his code of
professional ethics, nor has he in doing so automatically violated those
ethics. In an organization entirely composed of lawyers, it is difficult to
see how the control of the courts over lawyers and their conduct would
in any manner be altered.
A second objection urged by some is that the public will regard with
12
disfavor an attempt by lawyers to take advantage of a tax "loophole."
This charge is valid only if lawyers were to obtain more than tax equality,
which unquestionably they do not seek.
Finally, it is argued that to permit the corporate practice of law
would force individual practitioners to establish organizations, being unable to ignore the benefits available. 12 7 Thus, it is contended, not only
would the individual practitioner be eliminated, a man who furnishes a
needed independence and vigor to the legal profession and maintains an
unequaled personal relationship with clients, but law firms would tend to
become larger. 1 2 But those who have advocated the creation of organizations for tax advantages have always been quick to point out that the
professional association is not a panacea." 9 Unless a certain level of income is attained a professional association can prove unwise, especially if
it would be taxed as a corporation;.8 ° if that level is not met the SelfEmployed Individuals Tax Retirement Act would prove much more satisfactory. Moreover, although the single practitioner has been able to make
126. The rash of new statutes is barefacedly and singlemindedly directed
toward the attainment of federal income tax benefits. . . . The spectacle of
lawyers embracing such a scheme with enthusiasm is unlikely to improve upon
the public image of the profession, especially since those operating under the
new forms obtain . . . the gratuitous -benefit of curtailing their traditional
stringent liability toward clients.
Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 776, 789, (1962).
127. Marcus, Why Lawyers Should Not Be Permitted to Practice Law in Cor-

porate Form, 37 CAI.p. S.B.J. 898, 903 (1962).
128. Ibid.

129. Ohl, supra note 79.
130. To evaluate whether the benefits to be derived are greater than the
increased cost of the pension and profit sharing plans, he must have a competent evaluation of his individual situation. The tax bracket in which a man
finds himself and the extent of his nonprofessional payroll are factors to be
considered. As a general rule of thumb, if he is taxed on his present earnings
in a bracket of thirty per cent or higher, he will benefit in savings under this
plan.
Buchmann & Bearden, The Professional Service Corporation-A Business Entity, 16
U. MIAmi L. REv. 1, 18 (1961).

NOTES
a valuable contribution to the independence of the legal profession, large
law firms do provide an unparalleled quality of service, especially in the
more complex areas of the law.13' In short, to best protect the interests
of clients and himself, the lawyer must evaluate the ethics of association
on a rational basis, rather than on tradition and subject to arguments
1 32
which have at times been termed "legal hocus pocus.'

IV. CONCLUSION
The only competent body which may rule on the ethical propriety of
practicing law in an association which embodies corporate characteristics
is the Supreme Court of Indiana. Since the rules of the Supreme Court
do not contemplate the practice of law by a business trust, 3' until those
rules of procedure are altered to indicate that the court has considered
favorably the ethical propriety of practicing law in that form, such practice is impossible. The conservative attitude exemplified by the Ohio Supreme Court could be expected from Indiana's highest court should some
persons practice law in a business trust without first obtaining a change
in the supreme court's rules of procedure:
The inherent power of this court to prescribe standards for admission to the practice of law has been implemented by the adoption of Rule XIV of its Rules of Practice. By no stretch of
the imagination can the words of Rule XIV be expanded to
include any other than natural persons. And until such time
as this court through its rules for the admission to the practice
of law recognizes the right of a corporate entity to practice law,
the Secretary of State is under no clear duty to accept for filing
and record articles of incorporation which set forth that a purpose of the corporate entity is to "practice law."' 84
131. There is also ground for believing that large firms have brought about
higher standards of professional ethics.
In an article in the Law Journal, London, reprinted in 90 N.Y. Law Jour.
426 (Dec., 1933) entitled The Single Practitioner and Professional Misconduct,
the author says, "It is a striking fact that in over 97% of the cases which
have come before the Discipline Committee (London) since 1919 the solicitor
whose conduct was complained of had no partner, and that in that period of
fourteen years only five solicitors who were in partnership have been struck
off the rolls."
DRiNKER, LEGAL

ETHIcs 203, 204 (1953).

132. Lewis, Corporate Capacity to Practice Law-A Study in Legal Hocus Pocus,
2 M. L. Rzv. 342 (1937).
133. See IND. SUP. CT. R. 3-1 to 26.
134. State ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962).
Rule XIV of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure governing admission to the practice of
law is quite similar to the rules for admission to the practice of law in Indiana, and
the same implicit restrictions are present in both.
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If attorneys conclude after thoughtfully considering the present and
proposed Treasury Regulations that they can ethically practice in business
trust form and achieve the tax benefits of corporate organization, the
State Bar Association should be urged to petition the supreme court for
a rule change. The bar association of one state has taken this approach,
thus recognizing that the matter falls within the constitutional authority
of a state's highest court." 5 This course of action resulted in that instance in a critical analysis and ultimate approval of the proposal.
A great responsibility has been placed upon Indiana's judiciary and
legal profession to critically evaluate in light of the Canons of Professional Ethics the business trust as an organization for the practice of law.
They must weigh the advantages to be gained, with the possible disadvantages which might result. If they conclude that professional ethics
do not proscribe practice in business trust form, and the supreme court
condones such practice through their rules of procedure, adequate safeguards should be provided in those rules to insure the public welfare
would not thereby be adversely affected.

JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE IN INDIANA:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED REFORM
Indian 's method of selecting its judiciary by the partisan election process has for
years been considered wholly inadequate by those who have given it serious thought.
Yet that system persists, notwithstanding many efforts at legislative reform. The
Editors of the Indiana Law Journal feel it is the responsibility of all citizens, attorneys
and judges to continually seek adoption of the most sound method of selecting and retaining in public office those entrusted with the responsibility of administering justice.
The following nwte is presented as one writer's evaluation of the present system and its
alternatives, in the hope that it will stimudate thoughtful consideration of this matter.

The judges of Indiana courts have not always been swept on and off
the bench by the political tide.1 During the early years of statehood judges
of the Supreme Court were appointed by the Governor with the consent
of the Senate, and the president judges of the circuit courts by both
houses of the General Assembly. Only the associate judges of each circuit court, who exercised little authority, were elected to office.'
The appointive system as it existed in Indiana was not atypical in the
135. The Supreme Court of Florida changed its Integration Rule of the Florida
Bar, The Code of Ethics, and amended Rule 10 of The Rules Governing the Conduct of
Attorneys in Florida to allow attorneys to form professional corporations. These rules
are set forth in In re Florida Bar, 133 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
Upon its own motion the Colorado Supreme Court adopted a rule permitting
attorneys to form corporations to practice law. See COLO. SUP. CT. (Civ.) R. ch. 19,

§ 231.

1. A single political party has swept all vacant offices on the Indiana Supreme
and Appellate Courts in every general election since 1930 with one exception: in 1962,
six Republicans and one Democrat were elected judges of those courts. See Appendix.
2. IND. CoNsT. art. 5, § 3 (1816).

